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THE CRIM1INAL JURISDICTION OF EQUITY-PURPRESTURES AND OTHER PUBLIC NUISANCES
AFFECTING HEALTH AND SAFETY*
The function of a court of equity is not to protect the public
against crimes.' On the contrary, the foundation of equity
jurisdiction is in the enforcement of the civil law.2 At one period
in English history, from the reign of Richard II to the end of the
fiteenth century, equity played an important role in the enforcement of the criminal law, but this need vanished with the years.
However, in view of jurisdiction to protect the person ana
property of an individual from irreparable injury, equity will
not fail to intervene simply because the act may also 'be a crime. 3
In other words, equity may protect at the same time both public
and private rights.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine some instances
where equity has gone beyond the pale of civil rights and protected the public rights of the community. This involves a study
of equity intervention in purprestures and other public nuisances affecting the health and safety of the people. A public
nuisance is a crime at common law, subject to indictment and
punishment by the state.4 This paper will, therefore, attempt to
show, in a limited group of eases, equity enforcing the criminal
law.
*This is the second of a series of notes on "The Use of the Injunction to Prevent Crime". The first appeared in the November, 1931,
issue.
The following authorities will aid in a study of this problem:
Mack, Revival of Crim. Eq., 16 Harv. L. Rev. 389; Chafee, The Progress
of the Law, 34 Harv. L. R. 388; Shabaz, The Historical Development of
tile Power of Equity Courts to Enjoin Nuisances, 11 Marq. L. R. 32-8;
Schofield, Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as
Public Nuisances, 8 Ill. L. R. 19; Pound, Injunction Against Liquor
Nuisances, 9 Har. L. R. 521; Walsh, Equitable Relief Against Nuisance,
7 N. Y. U. L. R. 352, 374; Walsh, Equity, pp. 197, 201; Clark, Equity,
Sees. 222 and 223; Chafee, Cases on Equitable Relief Against Torts,
pp. 438-440; Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp., sec. 1893; Durfee, Cases on Equity,
p. 592; Summary Abatement of Nuisances, 2 Col. L. R. 203; 20 R. C. L.
385; 69 Am. St. Rep. 271.
'Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 370.
$Mack, Revival of Criminal Eq., 16 Harv. L. Rev. 389.
'Ibid, P. 392.
' Clark and Marshall on Crimes, sec. 446.
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The problem will be divided into two parts; (1) Historical
review of public nuisance cases; and (2) basis of equity jurisdiction.
(1)

Historical Development of Equitable Intervention in
Public Nuisance Cases.
(A) Purprestures and other public nuisances
affecting health and safety.

The first instance of an injunction against a public nuisance
appears in 1587 in Bond's Case. 5 In that case a tenant was
restrained from -buildingand maintaining a pigeon-house on the
ground that such would be a common nuisance. In the case of
Baines v. Baker,8 the plaintiff tried to get an injunction against
the building of a smallpox hospital. Lord Hardwicke denied
the injunction, saying if it were any kind of nuisance it was
public, and if it were a public nuisance the action should have
been brought on information in the name of the attorney
general.7 These two cases show equity intervening where a
wrong has been done to the public. The wrong is principally
one of menacing the health and safety of the King's subjects.
In Attorney General v. Richards,s the complaint alleged that
defendants had erected a wharf, docks, and other buildings
between high and low water mark in Porstmouth harbor so as to
prevent the vessels from sailing or mooring there, and to
endanger the harbor by preventing the current from carrying
off the mud. The information prayed for an injunction to
restrain further building and an abatement of the present struc-tures. The relief was granted on the ground that "where the
king claims and proves a right to the soil, where a purpresture
and nuisance have been committed, he may have a decree to
abate it." Here, then, is a case where equity protected the
Crown and the public from unlawful obstruction of navigation.
The encroachment on the Crown's soil amounts.to a purpresture,
while the accompanying interference of the public rights to use
the soil amounts to a public nuisance. 9
5Moore, 238 No. 372.
:l Amb. 158 (1752).
'Some doubt has been expressed as to whether he meant an in-

formation in Chancery.

82 Anstr. 603 (1795).
A purpresture is not necessarily a public nuisance, for to have
the latter there must be something which subjects the public to some
degree of inconvenience or annoyance. Take the case where a part of
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In most cases a purpresture is both a purpresture and a
public nuisance. There is, in other words, some infringement of

the public rights by virtue of the encroachment upon the
property held by the state (or crown) for the public enjoyment.10
In State v. Goodnight," the defendant enclosed public
school lands for the purpose of pasturing cattle. It was alleged
that such enclosure prevented the use of the land by the people
of the state for grazing cattle, and interfered with public travel
generally. The, Court declared the enclosure to he both a purpresture and a public nuisance, and subject to a mandatory
injunction to compel the defendant to remove such structures
and refrain from erecting any more. The Court went on to say
that even though public nuisances were indictable at common
law, yet they were at the same time subject to an injunction.
In Hibbard v. City of Chicago,'2 the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the city from taking down an awning erected over a street
in the city. The Court ruled that the permission given by the
city was a mere license, revocable at any time, and that the
permanent structure on the street was a purpresture and a
public nuisance and could not be maintained.
In People v. Vanderbilt,13 an injunction was asked to
restrain defendant from proceeding with the erection of a pier
in the New York harbor on the ground that it was an obstruction
to navigation and thereby a public nuisance. The Court held
the act a purpresture and a public nuisance, and issued an
injunction.
Equity, in abating and enjoining structures on land held by
the state or crown for the public, such structures amounting to
public nuisances, has gone over into the domain of public rights.
Or, in other words, equity is enforcing the criminal law. Perhaps
it is better to say that equity never ceased to assert its right to
the land appropriated for a highway is enclosed, but it happens to be a
part which the public never uses. Such an act would be unlawful and
could be abated and enjoined as a purpresture, but it would not be a
public nuisance. Attorney General v. Evart Booming Co., 34 Mich. 462,
473. Some cases deny relief where there is a purpresture and no public
nuisance. People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379; People v. Monld, 55 N. Y.
Sup. 453. Other cases grant relief under like circumstances. Revell v.
People, 177 Ill. 468, 479; Attorney General v. Smith, 109 Wis. 532.
Co
Commissioners v. Long, 1 Parson's Cases 143.
70 Tex. 682, 11 S. W. 119.
2173 Inl. 91; 50 S. E. 256.
126 N. Y. Rep. 287.
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protect property, even if the act also constituted a crime.
Chancellor Kent,' 5 commenting on Attorney Generalv. RBichards,
says that the precedents cited there show that equity jurisdiction
in public nuisance cases lay dormant for a century and a half,
or from the time of Charles I until 1795. The reluctance of
equity to enjoin public nuisances shows that the court sensed an
invasion of none too safe a ground. This reluctance continued
after 1795,16 and was as characteristic of early American judges
7
as it was of the English judiciary.'
The jurisdiction of equity in public nuisances is now
definitely settled. A state may intervene to prevent obstructions
to highways and to navigation, and to enjoin businesses
injuriously affecting the health and safety of the community.
The first clear case, other than purpresture, of an injunction at
the suit of the state against a public nuisance appears in
Attorney General v. H'unter.'8 The defendant was maintaining
a mill pond near the city of Raleigh. The complaint alleged
that such was destructive to the health and comfort of the citizens of Raleigh, and asked that the defendant be restrained
from continuing the pond. The court declared the pond a public
nuisance and granted the injunction. Equity goes a step further
here to prevent a crime. Not only must the individual be proItected in his right to use property held by the state for its
subjects, but his health and safety will be protected where the
injury results from a public nuisance.
In Attorney Generalv. Steward and Taylor,'9 an injunction
was asked to prevent defendants from building a slaughter
house in the city, on the ground that it would be a nuisance
injurious to the health of the citizens, and render the enjoyment
of life physically uncomfortable. An injunction against the
building of the house was refused, since it appeared that the
defendants intended to carry on the business so as not to constitute a nuisance, but the defendants were enjoined from
polluting a nearby stream, as this would constitute a nuisance

Revival of Criminal Eq., 389, 392.
uSupra, Nofe 1.
'6MaVor v. Bolt, 5 Ves. 129 (1799); Atty. Gen. v. Cleaver, 18 Ves.
210 (1811).
'1 Mack,

"7Kent, C., in Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., supra, note 1; Henderson,
J., Atty Gen. v. Hunter, 1 Dev. Eq. 12 (1826); Parker, C. J., Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 6 Pick. 376, 398 (1828).
"Supra, note 17; Durfee, Cases on Equity, p. 591.
1,21 N. J. Eq. 415.
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injurious to the health of the community. Thus, equity not only
stops a crime which is already in existence, but will also prevent
the commission of one.
In Attorney General v. Patterson,20 an injunction was
asked to restrain the town from discharging sewage into a
stream to the detriment of the health and comfort of people
living along the stream. The Court granted the injunction. The
wrongful act constituted a public nuisance.
These cases serve to illustrate the role which equity is playing in the protection of public health and safety. The cases are
today so numerous until equity jurisdiction of public nuisances
affecting the health and safety of the community is no longer a
20
question of doubt. a
A review of the cases shows that equity jurisdiction is not
limited to the protection of private rights. Public rights are
protected where the infringement amounts to a public nuisance.
Though equity is not a court of criminal jurisdiction, it takes
over such jurisdiction in enjoining public nuisances. The next
question which arises is: What is the basis of jurisdiction when
equity invades the field of criminal law? Is there some property
right to protect? Is the remedy at law inadequate? Other
questions of like nature suggest themselves once the problem is
stated.
(2)

Basis of Jurisdiction.
(A) What is the basis of jurisdiction in purpresture
cases which are at the same time public nuisances?

In the early case of Attorney General v. Richards,21 it was
argued that the wharves upon the space between the high- and
low-water mark were both a purpresture and a nuisance, the
former an encroachment upon the King's jus privatum to the
soil, and the latter an interference with the jus publicum of free
navigation. But the basis of the jurisdiction in this case is
recited in the following quotation from it: "
where
258 N. J. Eq. 1; 42 Atl. 749.
2'aAtty. Gen. v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 361 (1884);
.Peop7ev. White Lead Wks., 82 Mich. 471 (1890); 46 N. W. 735; Coumbus v. Jaques, 30 G'a. 506 (1860); People v. Gold Run Ditch Mining Co.,
66 Cal. 138, 155 (1884). See cases cited in footnote, p. 622, Ames, Cases
in Equity Jurisdiction.
a Supra, note 8.
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the King claims and proves a right to the soil where a purpresture and nuisance have been committed, he may have a decree to
abate it." Chancellor Kent, in his comment on this case, referred
to before 22 has this to say: ". . . the Crown established
a right of property in the soil, and it was a question of injury to
property, like the case of a private nuisance." So the basis of
jurisdiction in all purpresture cases seems to be the protection
of the property rights of the state or municipality in parks,
streets, highways, navigable waters, etc. 23 The state or city is
here protected like any other property owner. Such nuisances
which interfere with the use and enjoyment of public property
are restrained in equity exactly as in private nuisances, and for
similar reasons. 24 There should be no objection to this basis of
equity jurisdiction in cases of purprestures which amount to
public nuisances. There is no doubt about the property interest
to protect, and such a view cannot do violence to the well settled
rule that equity has jurisdiction in such cases.
(B)

What is the basis of jurisdiction in cases of
public nuisance, other than purpresture, which
affect the health and safety of the community ?

The early cases do no more than recite the phrase "irreparable injury" as the basis of equity's intervention. The
hesitancy of equity to intervene in these early cases has already
been pointed out. However, if the right was established at law,
equity would issue an injunction to prevent "irreparable injury" to property or health.2 5 Plainly, this does not constitute
a basis for jurisdiction, but rather a reason for granting relief.
Harlan, J., in Mugler v. Kansas,26 says the ground of jurisdiction lies in the ability of a court of equity to give a more speedy,
effectual and permanent remedy than can be had at law. This
same view was accepted in Missouri v. Illinois27 citing the Mugler
case. Here the Sanitary District of Chicago was enjoined from
discharging sewage (under authority of the Illinois Statute)
into the Mississippi River, such act being dangerous to the health
-2Supra, note 1.

2Walsh, Equity, p. 200.
2'Walsh, Equitable Relief Against Nuisance, 7 N. Y. U. Law Rev.,
352, 376.
2Crowder v. Tinckler, 19 Ves. Jr. 622; Atty Gen. v. Johnson,
2 Wilson Chan. 102; Chalk v. Wyatt, 3 Meriv. 688.
" 123 U. S. 623 at 673.
21180 U. S. 108.
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of the inhabitants of Missouri. In commenting on this case in
The court
Katmas v. Colarao 28 the court says: "
there ruled that the mere fact that a State had no pecuniary
interest in the controversy, would not defeat the original jurisdiction of this court, which might be invoked by the State as
parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or representatives of all or a
considerable portion of its citizens. . . ." An answer to the
same effect was given in Louisiana v. TexaS, 29 where the objection was made to the state not having any property right
involved.
It is clear that nuisances which are restrained in equity
because they injure the health and safety of the citizens (in
most cases at least) involve no property rights, and the reason
for equitable relief is the protection of public rights.3 0 But
what is the basis of this jurisdiction? It is difficult in some
cases to find a basis. In others, the ostensible basis is the efficacy
of equity as compared with the inadequacy at law. Equity can
prevent irreparable damage and multiplicity of suits.31 But
perhaps the soundest basis is to be found in the doctrine of the
state suing as parens patriae.
In order to examine more closely the soundness of this doctrine, it will be necessary to briefly review its origin. In
England, the king as paren3 patriae, had general supervision
over infants, idiots or lunatics, and charities, which he exercised
by the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor. The jurisdiction,
however, did not belong to the court of chancery, as a court of
equity, but as administering the prerogative and duties of the
Crown.32 This was a personal obligation of the chancellor, and
did not belong to his ordinary jurisdiction in chancery. 33 The
jurisdiction possessed by the English courts of chancery by
delegation of authority of the crown as parens patriae is
exercised by the courts of the state in this country. 34 The court
of chancery operated to protect the rights of those who had no
rightful protector. This old doctrine had its origin in the court
of chancery. In analogous cases today a court of equity can
- 185 U. S. 125, 142.
-176
U. S. 1.
0

' Walsh, Equity, p. 201.

z"Cfampbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568.
12Fontainv. Revenel, 17 How. 369, 392.
1 4 Kent, Com. 508 note.
'"Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 43S.
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protect its citizens annoyed by a public nuisance, where they,
like the infant or beneficiary of charity, cannot protect their
own rights. The chancellor is in a sense the representative of
the sovereign, as parens patriae,and the guardian of the people's
welfare. It is submitted that such should be sufficient basis for
equity to enjoin those cases of public nuisance which affect the
health and safety of individuals in the community.
CONCLUSION

Though equity is not a court of criminal jurisdiction, it
invades this field in extending its jurisdiction to public nuisance
cases. A public nuisance being a crime at common law, equity
is enforcing the criminal law, but not as such.
A review of the history of equity's interference in cases of
public nuisance shows the great hesitancy with which such cases
were taken over. This hesitancy characterized both the English
and American courts. But today the jurisdiction of equity is
well settled. This applies alike to purpresture cases which
amount to public nuisances, and to other nuisances which affect
the health and safety of the community.
The basis of equity jurisdiction in purpresture cases which
amount to public nuisances is the protection of property rights,
similar to cases of private nuisances. The basis of jurisdiction
in other nuisance cases, which endanger health and safety, is
variously defined. The soundest basis, it is believed, rests in
the doctrine of the state suing as parens patriae. This doctrine
is as deeply entrenched in equity's past as is the principle that
equity will protect the property rights of an individual
JOHN C. BAGWELL.

